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Whatever Happened to the Baby Bells? 
Internationalization and De-internationalization in 
the Telecommunications Industry 
Jason Whalley∗ & Peter Curwen∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Just after the turn of the millennium, the 
telecommunications industry made two assessments of the 
internationalization of the United States-based Baby Bells.1 
Chan-Olmstead and Jamison suggested that the Baby Bells had 
developed significant international footprints on the basis of 
which the Baby Bells could become global operators.2 In 
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 1. The Baby Bells are also known as regional Bell operating companies 
(RBOCs) or regional holding companies (RHCs). 
 2. Sylvia Chan-Olmsted & Mark Jamison, Rivalry Through Alliances: 
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contrast, Ratner stated that “the Yanks are going” and argued 
that a lack of buyers could prolong their exit from Europe.3 
Although Chan-Olmstead and Jamison4 reinforced earlier 
comments made by the likes of Hausman5, Kupfer,6 and 
Watson7 it was Ratner’s prediction8 that turned out to be the 
more accurate of the two. However, Ratner9 herself 
underestimated the scale of de-internationalization that the 
Baby Bells would undergo. By 2006, the Baby Bells had 
retreated not only from Europe but also from Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America. The Baby Bells have sold virtually all of their 
international operations to once again focus solely on the 
United States market. 
This paper provides an overview of the internationalization 
of the Baby Bells and analyzes why they have so 
enthusiastically embraced de-internationalization. With this in 
mind, the rest of the paper is structured as follows. Part I 
focuses on the Baby Bells, briefly describing the regulatory 
environment which led to their inception and development as 
major players in the domestic and international 
telecommunications markets.  Part II describes the 
methodology used to measure the international investments of 
the Baby Bells and analyzes the growth and decline of their 
overseas presence.  Part III posits that the Baby Bells have so 
dramatically changed their international strategies due to 
lagging financial returns, a changing regulatory environment, 
and the effect of various mergers and acquisitions within the 
industry. 
Competitive Strategy in the Global Telecommunications Market, 19 EUR. 
MGMT. J., 317, 328 (2001). 
 3. Juliana Ratner & Richard Waters, Baby Bells Look for a Way to Go 
Home from European Trip, FIN. TIMES, May 26, 2001, at 16. 
 4. Chan-Olmsted & Jamison, supra note 2. 
 5. Jerry A. Hausman, The Bell Operating Companies and AT&T Venture 
Abroad While British Telecom and Others Come to the United States, in 
GLOBALIZATION, TECHNOLOGY, AND COMPETITION:  THE FUSION OF 
COMPUTERS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE 1990S, 313 (Stephen P. 
Bradley, Jerry A. Hausman, & Richard L. Nolan eds., 1993). 
 6. Andrew Kupfer, Ma Bell and Seven Babies Go Global, FORTUNE, Nov. 
4, 1991 at 118. 
 7. Sharon Watson, US Carriers Go Overseas in Search of Telecom’s “Holy 
Grail”, TELEPHONY, Dec. 20 1993, at 18. 
 8. Ratner & Waters, supra note 3. 
 9. Id. 
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I. THE BABY BELLS 
In early 1982, the chairman of AT&T announced that it had 
settled its long-running dispute with the Department of 
Justice.10 This settlement, which technically altered AT&T’s 
1956 Consent Decree with the consequence that it was called 
the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ), required AT&T to divest 
its interests in twenty-two Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) 
that provided local telephone services.11  In return, AT&T was 
freed from its 1956 Consent Decree obligations, thereby 
enabling it to enter new markets such as information services or 
those outside of regulated telecommunications.12  The MFJ 
came into force at the start of 1984. . 
The MFJ required the management of AT&T to develop 
detailed plans to implement the divestiture of its BOCs.  These 
plans created seven Baby Bells holding companies, Bell 
Communications Research (Bellcore) to provide research 
services to the Baby Bells,13  and transferred the directory 
publishing operations of AT&T to individual Baby Bells.14  
Thus, upon divestiture, each of the Baby Bells was composed of 
at least one BOC, the directory publishing operations of AT&T 
within its region, and a one-seventh stake in Bell 
 10. For details of this dispute, which at its heart was centered on the 
uncooperative relationship between AT&T and new entrants such as MCI, see 
Richard H.K. Vietor, AT&T and the Public Good: Regulation and Competition 
in Telecommunications, 1910-1987, in FUTURE COMPETITION IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 27 (Stephen P. Bradley & Jerry A. Hausman eds., 
1989);  PETER TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM (1987); Marcellus S. 
Snow, The AT&T Divestiture:  A 10-Year Retrospective, in, BEYOND 
COMPETITION: THE FUTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 207 (Douglas M. 
Lamberton ed.,1995). 
 11. See Snow, supra note 10, at 211-212.  The MJF also required that 
AT&T sell its stakes in two other, non-Bell, local telecommunication 
companies, Cincinnati & Suburban and Southern New England Telephone.  Id. 
 12. See id. at 212. 
 13. Ownership of Bellcore was divided equally among the seven Baby 
Bells.  MICHAEL CARPENTIER ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION 25 
(1992).  A second role of Bellcore was to “serve as a coordination center for 
communication services with regard to national security interests and 
emergency services activities.” Id. at 26. 
 14. Given that the overarching rationale of divestiture was to separate 
monopoly from competitive activities, it was thought that the directory 
publishing activities would remain with AT&T.  However, as directory 
publishing revenues has been treated as BOC revenues for almost a decade 
prior to 1984, they were transferred to the Baby Bells where their revenues 
would help to reduce local charges.  DAVID CHESSLER ET AL., NAT’L REG. RES. 
INST., UNREGULATED ENTERPRISES OF THE BELL REGIONAL HOLDING 
COMPANIES (1986). 
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Communications Research.15  In contrast, the new-AT&T 
offered long-distance, manufacturing and research services 
organized in accordance with the Computer 2 enquiry.16 
Although this division of AT&T’s businesses resulted in a 
significantly smaller company, the new AT&T still had assets of 
$35 billion.17  In addition, each of the seven Baby Bells was a 
substantial enterprise in its own right. As shown in Table 1, the 
seven Baby Bells held assets ranging from $14.4 billion to $19.7 
billion with revenues varying from $7.8 billion to $10.5 billion.18 
Covering fourteen states, US West was geographically the 
largest of the Baby Bells, while Pacific Telesis had the fewest 
number of states – two – within its territory. The remaining 
Baby Bells covered between five and eight states. 
 
TABLE 1: THE BABY BELLS, JANUARY 198419 
Baby Bell Revenues 
$bn 
Profits 
$mn 
Assets 
$bn 
Employees No of 
states 
Ameritech 9.0 1100 15.4 79,000 6 
Bell Atlantic 9.1 1100 15.4 80,000 7 
BellSouth 10.5 1500 19.7 99,100 8 
Nynex 10.4 1100 16.2 98,200 6 
Pacific Telesis 8.5 970 15.3 82,000 2 
Southwestern 
Bell 
8.0 1000 14.8 74,700 5 
US West 7.8 950 14.4 75,000 14 
                                                          
 15. See CARPENTIER ET AL., supra note 13, at 25-26. 
 16. In 1997 the Federal Communications Commission launched an 
investigation, Computer 2 enquiry, to separate data communications services 
from data processing services.  WINDOWS ON A NEW WORLD: THE THIRD 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 162 (Joseph Finklestein ed., Greenwood Press 1989).  
The Computer 2 enquiry required that basic services be separated from 
advanced services.  As a result, AT&T on divestiture was comprised of two 
principal subsidiaries, AT&T Communications, responsible for long distance 
telecommunications within the United States, and AT&T Technologies. This 
latter company brought together Bell Laboratories with other companies such 
as AT&T International and AT&T Information Systems subsidiaries.  See 
CARPENTIER ET AL., supra note 13, at 28; see also Vietor, supra note 10, at 83 
for a full list of the businesses operated by AT&T Technologies. 
 17. Vietor, supra note 10, at 84. 
 18. CARPENTIER ET AL., supra note 13, at 22-23; Vietor, supra note 10, at 
82. See generally Brian O’Reilly, Ma Bell’s Kids Fight for Position, FORTUNE, 
June 27, 1983, at 62-69. 
 19. CARPENTIER ET AL., supra note 13, at 22-23; Vietor, supra note 10, at 
82. O’Reilly, supra note 18. 
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As it was widely believed that the Baby Bells would act in 
an anti-competitive manner like their former parent company,20 
significant restrictions were placed on them.21 The MFJ 
prohibited them from providing inter-exchange 
telecommunication services or information services, 
manufacturing or providing telecommunications products or 
customer premises equipment, and providing any other product 
or service, except exchange telecommunications and exchange 
access service that is not a natural monopoly service actually 
regulated by tariff.22 
The Baby Bells could, however, apply for waivers that 
would allow them to enter new lines of business if they could 
demonstrate that they would not exercise monopoly power in 
these markets.23 Unsurprisingly, the Baby Bells sought to limit 
these restrictions, by requesting waivers to enter a wide variety 
of new markets.24  By dint of numerous waiver applications, the 
Baby Bells were able to remove some of the lines of business 
restrictions.25 It was, however, only with the passing of the 
Telecommunications Act26 in February 1996 that their entry 
into the inter-exchange and equipment manufacturing markets 
became a possibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20. David Sappington, Revisiting the Line-of-Business Restrictions, 16 
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECON. 291, 291-293 (1995); Kevin R. Sullivan, 
Competition in Telecommunications:  Moving Toward a New Era of Antitrust 
Scrutiny and Regulation, in FUTURE COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
124-125 (Stephen P. Bradley & Jerry A. Hausman eds. 1989). 
 21. Vietor, supra note 10, at 84. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Snow, supra note 10, at 212. 
 24. See Sappington, supra note 20 at 125. 
 25. Paul H. Rubin & Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Costs of Delay and Rent-
Seeking Under the Modification of Final Judgment, in DEREGULATING 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS:  THE BABY BELLS CASE FOR COMPETITION 107-11 
(Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin eds. 1995). 
 26. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.), reprinted in 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614 
[hereinafter Telecommunications Act]. 
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TABLE 2: LINE OF BUSINESS RESTRICTIONS AND RELEASE 
DATES27 
Line of business restriction Release date 
Other non-regulated services September 1987 
Information services July 1991 
Inter-exchange telecommunication services February 1996 
Manufacturing products and CPE February 1996 
 
The 1996 Act also stated that the Baby Bells were free to 
enter the long-distance market once they had satisfied a 
fourteen-point competitive checklist.28 After an initial hiatus, 
when none of the Baby Bells were able to persuade regulators 
that their local markets were sufficiently competitive (one of the 
requirements of the fourteen-point checklist), the first long-
distance application was granted in December 1999 in New 
York. Since then, all of the Baby Bells have been granted 
permission to provide long-distance services.29 
As the regulatory framework changed, so too did the Baby 
Bells. Since their inception in 1984, the Baby Bells have 
expanded and diversified their markets and offerings as well as 
restructured their organizations. All of the Baby Bells expanded 
from the regional markets that they had inherited at divestiture 
into other parts of the United States, although some did so more 
vigorously than others.30 US West, for example, expanded into 
dispersed parts of the United States through the purchase of 
cellular and cable-television franchises.31 In contrast, 
Ameritech was more reserved in its expansion, preferring to 
focus on markets geographically contiguous to its five-state 
Great Lakes region, such as St Louis, Missouri, rather than on 
                                                          
 27. Jason L. Whalley, Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging Industries 
in Conditions of Market Imperfections: Telecommunications and the Case of 
the Regional Bell Operating Companies, 1984 – 1996 (Nov. 1999) (unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, University of Strathclyde) (on file with author). 
 28. Telecommunications Act, supra note 26. 
 29. Peter Curwen, For Whom the Bells Toll, 5 INFO 81, 81-82 (2003). 
 30. Whalley, supra note 27. 
 31. Tomo Noda & Joseph L. Bower, Strategy Making as Iterated Processes 
of Resource Allocation, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 159 (1996). 
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ited States.32 other parts of the Un
The Baby Bells also engaged in diversification. In the 
immediate aftermath of divestiture, the Baby Bells entered a 
wide range of new lines of business, and while some of these 
were related to their core telecommunications operations, others 
were not.33 US West acquired a substantial property portfolio 
within its region while Nynex entered both the software and 
computer retailing markets.  Bell Atlantic entered the computer 
industry, though most of its diversification appears to have 
focused on the leasing and financing markets. The expansion of 
the Baby Bells into non-telecommunications markets continued 
until the early 1990s, when regulatory changes and the 
continued disappointing financial results of many of the 
diversified investments resulted in reversal.  As a consequence, 
by the late 1990s the Baby Bells had largely exited these 
businesses. 
The Baby Bells also restructured themselves. The various 
restructurings that have occurred are shown in Figure 1, which 
highlights the complexity of a consolidation process that by 
early 2006, reduced the number of Baby Bells to three, namely 
Qwest (US West), Verizon Communications (Bell Atlantic, 
Nynex), and AT&T (Ameritech, BellSouth, Pacific Telesis, 
Southwestern Bell). The consolidation process that resulted in 
these three Baby Bells is explained below, with each of the 
three being addressed in turn. 
 
FIGURE 1: BABY BELL RESTRUCTURING, 1984-2006   
                                                          
 32. Whalley, supra note 27. 
 33. Whalley, supra note 27. The Baby Bells entered into a wide variety of 
new markets including, real estate, computer retailing, financial services, 
software development and liquefied petroleum gas distribution.  Id. 
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After expanding outside of its region through both 
acquisitions and joint ventures, US West grouped all of its non-
BOC operations together in 1995 into a new holding company 
called US West Media Group. Tracking shares in this new 
holding company were then issued pro-rata to all existing US 
West shareholders.34  In addition, US West sold its domestic 
cellular operations to AirTouch Communications in April 1998 
for $5.9 billion which eventually became part of Verizon 
Wireless, a joint venture between Verizon Communications and 
Vodafone. 
AT&T 
In 1997, the board of US West sought to formalize the 
separation of its BOC and non-BOC operations via a proposal to 
separate US West Media from US West. Prior to the actual 
separation, regulatory requirements necessitated the transfer of 
the fourteen-state directory publishing operations from US 
West Media to US West for $4.75 billion in debt and stock. The 
domestic cable-television businesses, as well as all of the 
international operations of US West, were spun off as 
MediaOne in June 1998.  AT&T subsequently acquired 
MediaOne in April 1999 for $58 billion as part of its drive to 
become a key player in the U.S. broadband market.35 
The spin-off of MediaOne meant that US West was almost 
the same as it was at divestiture in 1984; that is, a company 
providing local telephone and directory publishing services 
within its region. The revenue and earnings stability associated 
with both businesses made US West an attractive takeover 
target, especially to companies in search of revenues to fund 
expansion in other markets. After a short bidding war between 
two long distance operators, Global Crossing and Qwest 
International, US West succumbed to a $51.3 billion takeover 
from Qwest International in June 1999. US West subsequently 
changed its name to Qwest. 
 34. US WEST COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, 1995 FINANCIALS (1996).  By 
issuing tracking shares, US West was able to create a stock that followed that 
performance of its non-BOC operations without separating ownership of these 
operations from the Baby Bell.  If any dividends were paid, these would be 
funded by the non-BOC operations. 
 35. See PETER CURWEN & JASON WHALLEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
STRATEGY – CASES, THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 78-99 (2004).  The focus of 
AT&T at the time on the United States broadband market contributed to its 
decision to sell most of the international operations of MediaOne, a process 
that also helped AT&T recoup a substantial proportion of the cost.  Id. 
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Bell Atlantic and Nynex are two Baby Bells whose fortunes 
became interwoven. Less than two months after the 
Telecommunications Act of 199636 became law, Bell Atlantic 
entered into a $25.6 billion “merger of equals” with Nynex.37 
This consolidated its position in the northeast of the United 
States, and increased its stake to 50% in PCS PrimeCo, a 
cellular joint venture that eventually became part of Verizon 
Wireless. In July 1998, Bell Atlantic merged with GTE in a deal 
valued at $67 billion, and on completion of the merger changed 
its name to Verizon Communications. Finally, after a short 
bidding war with Qwest, Verizon Communications acquired 
MCI in early 2005 for $10.8 billion. 
Through a variety of maneuvers, the remaining four Baby 
Bells consolidated to become AT&T. In late 1993, Pacific Telesis 
grouped together its non-regulated subsidiaries in PacTel 
Corporation and sold 14% of its stock to outside shareholders. 
Just a few months later, in April 1994, Pacific Telesis 
distributed its remaining stake in PacTel Corporation on a pro-
rata basis to its existing shareholders.  On completion of the 
spin-off, PacTel Corporation changed its name to AirTouch 
Communications.  . 
In April 1996, SBC Communications, formerly 
Southwestern Bell,38 entered into a $16.5 billion “merger of 
equals” with Pacific Telesis.  During 1998, SBC 
Communications merged with two more telecommunication 
companies. In January 1998 it merged with SNET though given 
their relative sizes this was effectively an acquisition,39  in May 
it merged with Ameritech in a deal worth $68 billion.40 
 36. Telecommunications Act, supra note 26. 
 37. BELL ATLANTIC CORP., 1998 ANNUAL REPORT (1999).  In the “merger of 
equals” between Nynex and Bell Atlantic, Nynex became a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Bell Atlantic and its shareholders received stock in Bell Atlantic.  
This qualified the merger as a tax-free reorganization, which meant that all 
financial accounts prior to the merger had to be restated as if they had been a 
single company all along.  Id. 
 38. Southwestern Bell changed its name to SBC Communications in 1994, 
in part to downplay its geographical heritage. 
 39. Press Release, Southern New England to Merge with SBC 
Communications (Jan. 5, 1998), available at http://www.att.com/gen/press-
room?pid=4800&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=6492.  The disparity in size 
between SNET and SBC is illustrated by the distribution of shares in the 
merged company.  Although the deal valued SNET at $4.4 billion, its 
shareholders would hold 6% of the resulting company’s shares while SBC 
shareholders would hold the remaining 94%.  Id. 
 40. SBC COMMUNICATIONS INC., ANNUAL REPORT 1998 26 (1999). 
WHALLEY J & CURWEN P. Whatever Happened to the Baby Bells? Internationalization and De-
internationalization in the Telecommunications Industry. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
2006;8(1):149-173.  
158 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 8:1 
 
                                                          
 
In 2000, SBC Communications and BellSouth merged their 
domestic cellular operations to form Cingular Wireless, a 60-40 
joint venture.41  In October 2004, Cingular Wireless paid $41 
billion to acquire AT&T Wireless, one of the companies that 
emerged from the restructuring of AT&T just after the turn of 
the millennium.42.  This restructuring effectively saw AT&T 
divest its wireless and broadband operations and close its 
residential long-distance business to new customers in order to 
focus on the corporate long-distance market. 
At the start of 2005, SBC Communications announced its 
intention to merge with AT&T in a deal valued at $16 billion. 
When the merger was approved in November 2005, SBC 
Communications changed its name to AT&T. In March 2006 
AT&T announced that it would merge with BellSouth in a deal 
valued at $84 billion. Although both sets of shareholders have 
approved the merger, final approval is not expected until the 
latter part of 2006.  Assuming that regulatory approval is 
forthcoming as anticipated, this merger will, as shown in Figure 
1, reduce the number of independent Baby Bells to three: 
Qwest, Verizon Communications, and AT&T. 
II. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DE-
INTERNATIONALIZATION OFTHE BABY BELLS 
During the period that the Baby Bells underwent 
restructuring, their international ambitions and footprints also 
evolved.  This is the focus of the remainder of the paper. The 
frequent name changes of the Baby Bells may cause confusion. 
To avoid this, the following convention is adopted in the rest of 
this paper: SBC is used throughout the period from 1984 to 
2006, while Bell Atlantic and Nynex are used in conjunction 
with events occurring between 1984 and 1996. Between 1996 
and 1998 Bell Atlantic/Nynex is used, whereas after 1998 
Verizon is adopted. 
 41. Press Release, BellSouth, SBC Create Nation’s 2nd Largest Wireless 
Company with $10.2 Billion in Revenues (Apr. 5, 2000), available at 
http://bellsouth.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=press_releases&item=2688. 
 42. Press Release, Cingular Wireless, Cingular to Acquire AT&T Wireless, 
Create Nation’s Premier Carrier (Feb. 17, 2004), available at 
http://cingular.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=press_releases&item=520. 
WHALLEY J & CURWEN P. Whatever Happened to the Baby Bells? Internationalization and De-
internationalization in the Telecommunications Industry. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
2006;8(1):149-173.  
2007] WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE BABY BELLS? 159 
                                                          
A. METHODOLOGY FOR MEASURING INTERNATIONALIZATION 
There is no consensus as to how internationalization should 
be measured. Dörrenbächer and Sullivan both suggest three 
broad categories of possible measurement indicators: structural, 
performance, and attitudinal.43 According to Dörrenbächer, 
structural indicators are those that provide a picture of the 
international entanglement of a company at a given moment in 
time.  Examples include the number of countries in which the 
company is present, as well as foreign assets as a percentage of 
total assets.44  In contrast, performance indicators measure how 
well the company is performing abroad. Two such indicators 
are, according to Dörrenbächer, turnover and operating profit.45 
Sullivan suggests three possible measures: research and 
development intensity, advertising intensity, and export sales 
as a percentage of total sales.46 Attitudinal measures focus on 
the relationship between the home country of the 
internationalizing company and its operations abroad. One 
possible measure is the amount of international experience 
senior management possess while another is the psychic 
dispersion of the international operations.47 
Although a wide range of possible measures of 
internationalization have been suggested, some are easier to 
implement than others. In particular, the availability of data 
influences which measures are feasible and which are not. 
Moreover, the Baby Bells do not by any means describe their 
international operations in detail. As a consequence, it is hard 
to determine the exact size of their international operations in 
terms of capital invested, revenue, or subscribers. In addition, 
the data can also be inconsistent between years, not least 
because the Baby Bells regularly restate their accounts to 
reflect acquisitions and divestments as well as changing 
regulatory requirements. This is particularly problematic when 
restatements are made that affect several years, requiring a 
decision as to whether each year should be treated separately as 
reported at the time or whether the most recent sequence of 
 43. See Cristoph Dörrenbächer, Measuring Corporate Internationalisation:  
A Review of Measurement Concepts and Their Use, 35 INTERECONOMICS 119 
(2000); Daniel Sullivan, Measuring the Degree of Internationalization of a 
Firm, 25 J. OF INT’L BUS. STUDIES 325 (1994). 
 44. Dörrenbächer, supra note 43, at 120. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Sullivan, supra note 43, at 331. 
 47. Id. at 332. 
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data from the company should be used. 
The international operations of the Baby Bells are also 
obscured by their consolidations with other businesses. Since 
1984, these international operations have been consolidated 
with their diversified holdings, directory-publishing operations 
or with all non-regulated activities.48 The inconsistency that 
occurs, both between years and between Baby Bells, complicates 
any attempt to undertake a longitudinal analysis of their 
internationalization. This inconsistency also means that a 
longitudinal financial analysis of internationalization in a 
manner similar to Daßler et al49 or Gerpott and Jakopin50 is not 
possible for the Baby Bells. 
While financial data are not provided for all international 
operations, it is possible to calculate the balance between 
regulated and non-regulated Baby Bell revenues. However, non-
regulated revenues can, depending on the Baby Bell, contain 
revenues from non-telecommunication activities such as 
property management or computer retailing, as well as 
directory publishing, domestic cellular, and international 
revenues.51 Moreover, not only has the balance between 
regulated and non-regulated revenues changed over time but 
the portfolio of activities contributing to the non-regulated 
activities has also changed.52  If the proportion of non-regulated 
revenue increases over time, this may be due to revenue growth 
in one of several revenue sources or a decline in regulated 
 48. CHESSLER ET AL., supra note 14.  The authors were surprised at the 
complex organizational structures that the Baby Bells adopted in the 
aftermath of divestiture given their previous arguments against structural 
separation.  Id. at 54-59.  The structures adopted effectively divided the Baby 
Bells into two; that is into the Bell Operating Companies and support services 
on the one hand and everything else on the other.  The international 
investments of the Baby Bells would be included in this “everything else” 
category. 
 49. Thoralf Daßler et al., Economic Performance in European 
Telecommunications, 1978-1998: A Comparative Study, 14 EUR. BUS. REV. 
194 (2002). 
 50. Torsten J. Gerpott & Nejc M. Jakopin, The Degree of 
Internationalization and the Financial Performance of European Mobile 
Network Operators, 29 TELECOMM.  POL’Y 635 (2005). 
 51. See EDWIN ROSENBERG ET AL., NAT’L REG. RES. INST., REGIONAL 
TELEPHONE HOLDING COMPANIES: STRUCTURES, AFFILIATE TRANSACTIONS, 
AND REGULATORY OPTIONS 93-105 (1993) for a discussion of the relationship 
between regulation and revenues. 
 52. See Whalley, supra note 27. 
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revenues. In other words, non-regulated revenue is too broad a 
category to shed light on the Baby Bells’ international 
investment revenue trends. 
Due to the limited availability of data and the inherent 
inconsistency of much of what is available, the approach 
adopted here is to take data from the annual reports without 
considering any restatements that may subsequently occur. In 
other words, only data for the year just finished are taken from 
each annual report. All international investments that appear 
in annual reports are considered, and when constructing the 
international presence of each of the Baby Bells they are 
treated the same. In other words, no account is taken of the 
different scale of the international investments. 
Although it is acknowledged that this means that two 
international investments with, for instance, vastly different 
revenues will be treated as identical when in reality they are 
not, such a stance has been adopted because data are 
incomplete. Quite simply, the annual reports of the Baby Bells 
do not provide sufficiently detailed data between 1984 and 2006 
to determine the size of every international investment they 
made. Thus, while determinants of size such as subscribers, 
revenues and capital invested will be used where appropriate, 
no systematic attempt is made to compare the size of all of the 
Baby Bells’ international investments. 
Multiple investments in the same country are counted 
separately, primarily so that the number of separate 
investments made outside the United States for each Baby Bell 
can be ascertained. A second reason is that, on occasion, the 
Baby Bells have invested in several different lines of business 
within the same country. For example, US West invested in 
three different lines of business in the United Kingdom (UK).53 
In total, eight different lines of business are identified, namely: 
cable, cellular, content, data, equipment, fixed (which includes 
public telephone operators, second national operators, facilities 
management, long-distance, and international cable), paging 
and services (which includes directory and information services, 
software, alarms, and security services).  However, when the 
number of countries is determined, multiple businesses in the 
same location are discounted. 
Wherever possible the equity stake held by a Baby Bell in 
its international investment has been identified. For all but 
 53. US WEST, UNLOCKING THE VALUE: INVESTOR’S HANDBOOK 38ff (1994). 
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sixteen investments, it has been possible to identify the equity 
stake held. Equity stakes are integral to calculating the 
proportionate subscribers of cellular investments. However, this 
is far from straightforward since not only is the number of 
subscribers often hard to ascertain but the equity stakes held by 
the Baby Bells also change between years and are 
inconsistently documented. Particular attention was paid to 
identifying holding companies so that the problems identified by 
Curwen54 were avoided. 
Although a number of investments were identified that in 
turn have subsidiaries, only the initial investment was included 
in the analysis. One reason for this was the lack of data that 
would enable all of the subsidiary investments to be tracked, 
while a second reason was that the minority stake in many of 
the investments limited the ability of the Baby Bells to 
influence management. However, determining how Cingular 
Wireless should be treated in the analysis is not 
straightforward. As a joint venture between two Baby Bells, 
Cingular could conceivably be included in the totals for both 
BellSouth and SBC.  However, an argument can be made that 
since SBC is the majority shareholder Cingular should be 
included solely within its total. Ultimately, including Cingular 
within the totals for both Baby Bells would inflate the number 
of investments, and distort the subsequent analysis.  Therefore, 
when this and SBC’s merger with BellSouth were taken into 
account, Cingular and its various subsidiaries were included 
only within SBC’s total. 
B. INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DE-INTERNATIONALIZATION 
1. Total Number of International Investments 
Figure 2 enables a series of observations to be made 
regarding the internationalization and de-internationalization 
of the Baby Bells. In the first place, the Baby Bells have 
collectively made 198 international investments between 
January 1984 and August 2006.  There is considerable variation 
in the number of investments made each year; in some years 
only a handful of investments were made while in 1991 almost 
thirty investments were made.  Hence, the “golden age” of 
 54. Peter Curwen, A Brief Illustrated Discourse on the Concept of “Large” 
in the Context of Mobile Telephony, 7 INFO 76 (2005). 
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internationalization would appear to have been between 1991 
and 1995.  During these five years, ninety-three international 
investments were made with the result that the number of 
investments held peaked between 1996 and 1997. 
 
A second observation is that from 1991 onwards the 
number of international acquisitions that the Baby Bells made 
gradually declined with the exception of two years, 1995 and 
2004. The first exceptional year, 1995, falls within the “golden 
age” noted above while the second does not. The increase in 
2004 was due to the acquisition by Cingular Wireless of AT&T 
Wireless that brought with it a large international portfolio 
located primarily in the Caribbean.  Despite this seemingly 
significant international acquisition, relatively few subscribers 
were located outside of the United States.55  Furthermore, in 
the year after acquiring AT&T Wireless, Cingular sold all of its 
international operations except one, partly to satisfy regulatory 
requirements arising from the acquisition and partly to exit 
markets in which it was no longer interested. 
 
 
FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS, JANUARY 
1984 – AUGUST 2006 
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 55. Although AT&T Wireless had 23,952 million proportionate (equity) 
subscribers at the end of December 2004, 22.1 million of these were located in 
the United States. The Caribbean accounted for just over 300,000 
proportionate subscribers between them, while India accounted for 1.545 
million.   
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A final observation is that from 2000 onwards the Baby 
Bells sold more international investments than they acquired. 
In other words, their de-internationalization began in earnest 
during 2000. This is, however, slightly misleading as it ignores 
the de-internationalization associated with the divestments of 
AirTouch Communications by Pacific Telesis and of MediaOne 
by US West. Both of these divestments, in 1994 and 1998 
respectively, reduced the overall number of international 
investments, though given the larger international portfolio of 
MediaOne its divestment was the more significant of the two. 
By September 2006, as a consequence of divestments and sales, 
the Baby Bells held just seven international investments 
between them. 
2. NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL 
BABY BELLS 
Figure 2 does not show the variation that exists between 
the Baby Bells in terms of the number of international 
investments that they made. From Figure 3 (below) it can be 
seen that the maximum number of international investments 
held by the Baby Bells ranged from seven by Ameritech to 
thirty-six by Verizon (Bell Atlantic on the Chart). However, the 
abrupt ending of lines for four Baby Bells signifies either the 
complete divestment of their international operations (Pacific 
Telesis and US West) or the year in which they merged with 
another Baby Bell with the consequence that their international 
investments were transferred to the new company (Ameritech 
and Nynex). When this is taken into account, the thirty-six 
investments held by Verizon are in fact the result of Bell 
Atlantic’s mergers with Nynex and GTE. Thus, the largest 
number of international investments held by a single Baby Bell 
was thirty-four by US West in 1996. 
 
FIGURE 3: NUMBER OF INVESTMENTS BY BABY BELL, 1984 – 
AUGUST 2006 
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Verizon Communications continued its international 
expansion until 2001 when it affected an abrupt volte-face. 
Beginning in 2002, Verizon sold, in all, thirty-three 
international investments so that by August 2006 just two were 
left.56 The two that remain are a half share in Gibraltar-Nynex 
Communications and a 23.1% stake in Vodafone Italy. 
SBC also increased its international footprint through its 
merger with Ameritech in 1998. The merger added seven new 
holdings, although its impact was partially offset by the sale of 
international investments within its existing portfolio as well as 
among the newly acquired operations. From 1998 onwards, SBC 
steadily offloaded its international investments, although its 
portfolio dramatically increased once more in 2004 with 
Cingular’s acquisition of AT&T Wireless. However, this upturn 
was only temporary: Cingular sold two of the newly acquired 
investments in 2004, twelve in 2005 and has retained just the 
one in the United States Virgin Islands. It also continued to sell 
its original portfolio of holdings. 
Figure 3 also shows that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
BellSouth was at the forefront of Baby Bell internationalization. 
BellSouth rapidly built the largest international portfolio.  This 
resulted in a shift in its strategic priorities away from Australia 
- where it owned various paging businesses as well as a stake in 
Optus, the second national operator – and towards cellular 
markets.  This resulted in a small decrease before it remained 
more or less steady until the turn of the millennium. 
Another strategic change, this time in favor of Latin 
American cellular markets, resulted in a further withdrawal, 
primarily from Europe, as did BellSouth’s exit from Brazil due 
to tougher-than-anticipated market conditions there. Although 
BellSouth had previously claimed that Latin America was a 
strategic priority along with broadband, long-distance and 
domestic wireless, it sold its Brazilian investments in March 
2004 to Telefónica Móviles for $5.85 billion.57 
3. Line of Business Entered by Baby Bell 
It is also possible to identify the different lines of business 
 56. Although Verizon announced the sale of its operations in the 
Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico and Venezuela in April 2006, these were 
subject to regulatory approval that is in the process of being granted. 
 57. See BELLSOUTH, CONNECTING TO WHAT’S IMPORTANT:  (2001) ANNUAL 
REPORT TO SHAREHOLDERS (2002). 
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that the Baby Bells invested in overseas. Eight lines of business 
are identified in Table 3. The first point that can be made is 
that one line of business, cellular, accounts for 40% of all the 
investments made by the Baby Bells, a figure that vastly 
exceeds cable, the second most popular line of business. Taken 
together, these two lines of business account for almost 60% of 
all the investments made. It is worth noting that although 
twenty-nine “fixed” and twenty-five “services” investments were 
made, these two categories are quite broad. Consequently, in 
the services category, directory publishing and information 
services are the two main sub-categories, while in the fixed 
category, investment in public telephone operators is the largest 
sub-category. Even if these sub-categories were separated out, 
the largest, public telephone operators would, at best, 
numerically have the same number of investments as paging 
and thus account numerically for only a small area of 
investment for the Baby Bells. 
 
TABLE 3: BABY BELL INVESTMENT BY LINE OF BUSINESS58 
  Ameri- 
tech 
Bell 
Atlantic 
Bell-
South 
Nynex Pacific 
Telesis 
SBC US 
West 
Total 
Li
ne
 o
f b
us
in
es
s 
Cable - 3 1 3 2 3 18 30 
Cellular 4 10 18 9 4 25 15 85 
Content 1 2 - - - - 1 4 
Data - - 6 1 - - - 7 
Equipment - 7 - - - 1 - 8 
Fixed 4 11 2 1 4 6 1 29 
Paging - 1 4 - - - - 10 
Services 2 5 3 5 7 4 4 25 
Total 11 39 34 19 17 39 39 198 
 
Secondly, the investment portfolios of four Baby Bells are 
bipolar. Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, Pacific Telesis and US West 
all have two lines of business that have received more or less 
the same number of international investments. For Ameritech, 
Bell Atlantic and Pacific Telesis the two lines of business are 
cellular and fixed whereas for US West is it cable and cellular. 
                                                          
 58. AT&T INC., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT (2006). BELLSOUTH FOUND., 
CONNECTING TO WHAT’S IMPORTANT: (2001) ANNUAL REPORT TO 
SHAREHOLDERS (2002), BELLSOUTH FOUND., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT (2004), 
BELLSOUTH CORP., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT: THIS IS NOT A PHONE LINE… (2006). 
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US West stands out as the only Baby Bell to invest extensively 
in cable businesses overseas, accounting for almost two-thirds of 
all Baby Bell investments in that market. In contrast, 
BellSouth has overwhelmingly favored cellular, as has SBC. 
Although the difference between cellular and the other lines of 
business for Nynex is not as great, it does account for almost 
half of all the international investments that it made. 
Broadly speaking, three-quarters of all the international 
investments took place during the 1990s which, when 
widespread liberalization and the introduction of competition 
are taken into account, is perhaps not surprising. What could be 
viewed as a surprise, however, is that the lines of business in 
which the Baby Bells have invested has changed over time. In 
the 1980s, three lines of business were preferred: equipment, 
paging and services. All eight equipment international 
investments were made by Bell Atlantic and SBC during the 
1980s, while most paging and service investments also occurred 
during this decade. Both BellSouth and Pacific Telesis invested 
in paging businesses on a more or less equal basis, whereas 
several Baby Bells made service investments throughout the 
decade.  During the 1990s, in contrast, investments took place 
in different lines of business. Investments in cable, which began 
at the end of the 1980s, continue throughout the decade to be 
joined by two other lines of business, cellular and fixed. Cellular 
investments accounted for 45% of all investments throughout 
the decade, and regularly constituted the single largest area of 
investment numerically in each year. 
4. International Expansion Through Merger Activity 
Both Bell Atlantic and SBC have engaged in domestic 
mergers with companies that already had an established 
international presence of their own, resulting in often quite 
substantial changes to their international footprints in the 
process. Prior to its 1996 merger with Nynex, the 
internationalization of Bell Atlantic could readily be described 
as largely disappointing, albeit with two exceptions, TCNZ and 
Omnitel in Italy. While Bell Atlantic steadily expanded its 
international footprint, it was not until 1990 that it made its 
first significant investment overseas when it joined with 
Ameritech to acquire TCNZ for $2.5 billion.59 This was then 
followed three years later by an investment in Grupo Iusacell, a 
 59. BELL ATLANTIC, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 33 (1992). 
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Mexican wireless operator, and by investment in Omnitel, an 
Italian wireless operator, in 1994.60 
TCNZ, Grupo Iusacell, and Omnitel are financially the 
three largest international investments made by Bell Atlantic. 
While TCNZ and Omnitel can be considered very successful 
international investments, the same cannot be said for Bell 
Atlantic’s investment in Grupo Iusacell. In November 1993, Bell 
Atlantic invested $520 million to acquire a 23% stake in the 
Mexican wireless operator, and invested a further $524 million 
the following June to increase its stake to 41.9%.  Although Bell 
Atlantic was initially very enthusiastic about this investment, 
problems were soon encountered and it was dragged into a 
corruption scandal involving the founding Peralta family. 
Subsequently, Bell Atlantic invested once more in Grupo 
Iusacell with the consequence that its total investment in the 
company increased to $1.7 billion. Unsatisfactory growth by the 
company, as well as continued unfavorable economic conditions, 
eventually forced Bell Atlantic/Nynex to write-off $957 million 
of its investment before selling its stake in the company in 
2003.61 
Bell Atlantic suffered other disappointments when 
internationalizing prior to its merger with Nynex. The Baby 
Bell participated in consortia in Australia, South Korea, and 
Taiwan, with those in Australia and Taiwan failing to win a 
cellular license while the alliance with Korea Telecom came to 
nothing.62  With the sale of the European equipment 
businesses, the international footprint lacked geographical 
coherence and was generally regarded as 
The merger of Bell Atlantic and Nynex helped to rectify this 
as the international footprint of Nynex complemented that of 
Bell Atlantic. The merger extended its international footprint 
into six new countries and complemented its existing presence 
in both Europe and Asia. For example, Nynex but not Bell 
Atlantic was present in Greece, and although both Baby Bells 
were present in the Czech and Slovak Republics, they operated 
 60. BELL ATLANTIC, INVESTOR’S REFERENCE GUIDE 95 78ff (1996). 
 61. VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, INC., DELIVERING THE NEW WORLD OF 
COMMUNICATIONS: 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2004). 
 62. C.D. WASDEN, NAT’L REGULATORY RESEARCH INST., A DESCRIPTIVE 
COMPENDIUM OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF MAJOR U.S. BASED 
UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES 93-10 (1993). 
 63. Looking for the Turnpike, GLOBAL TELECOMM. BUS. (1994). 
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in different lines of business—directory publishing in the case of 
Nynex and cellular for Bell Atlantic. 
The merger of Bell Atlantic/Nynex with GTE further 
expanded its international footprint. Perhaps surprisingly, the 
ten international investments of GTE were all located in 
countries in which neither Bell Atlantic nor Nynex were 
present, and included countries that Bell Atlantic had 
previously sought unsuccessfully to enter such as Taiwan. The 
two European investments, in Austria and Hungary, 
complemented the existing Bell Atlantic/Nynex investments as 
they were both geographically near and in a line of business in 
which the Baby Bell was already active, namely, directory 
publishing. 
GTE also operated five fixed-wire investments in what can 
best be described as an eclectic range of countries. Two of these 
investments were located in the Pacific and one each in Canada, 
the Caribbean, and Latin America. The scattered nature of 
these investments broadened the resulting international 
footprint as much as the complementary European operations 
gave it coherence. Although additional international 
investments were made after the merger with GTE, these did 
not fill in the gaps, the most substantial of which was in 
Canada where the Baby Bell already had a presence. Given the 
limited nature of these additional investments, the merger 
between Bell Atlantic/Nynex and GTE could be viewed as 
marking the highpoint of the Bell Atlantic’s 
internationalization. 
SBC has also entered into mergers that have impacted its 
international presence. The internationalization of SBC can be 
divided into two periods on either side of 1995. Prior to 1995, 
SBC invested in four different lines of business, cellular, 
equipment, fixed-wire, and services.  The businesses are located 
in a geographically diffuse set of countries including Australia, 
France, Israel, Mexico, and the UK. Notwithstanding this 
apparent lack of focus, Maney64 described the international 
holdings as “brilliant” though it can be argued that this was 
primarily due to the investment in Telmex, the success of which 
has been described above. 
After 1995, SBC focused most of its internationalization 
efforts on two lines of business, namely cellular and fixed-wire, 
 64. KEVIN MANEY, MEGAMEDIA SHAKEOUT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 
LEADERS AND THE LOSERS IN THE EXPLODING COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 
(1995). 
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although it did continue to invest across a broad range of 
countries. Although most of these investments were focused on 
the cellular market, in 1997 SBC acquired three stakes in fixed-
wire operators, Golden Lines International (Israel), diAx 
(Switzerland) and Telekom South Africa (Republic of South 
Africa).65 The merger with Ameritech in the following year 
added four more fixed-wire investments, but as the remaining 
stake in TCNZ was sold in 1998, the net addition to SBC’s fixed-
wire portfolio was three.66 As all three investments were in 
Europe, the merger expanded SBC’s European footprint. 
Even though SBC made two more investments in fixed-wire 
operators, these were in contrast to the sale of fixed-wire 
investments that began in 1999 but mainly constituted sales 
during 2003 and 2004. As the sale of investments was not 
restricted to fixed-wire, 1998 effectively marked the high point 
of internationalization by SBC. The acquisition of AT&T 
Wireless by Cingular Wireless did expand its international 
footprint, albeit only temporarily as most operations were sold 
during 2004. 
III. WHY THE BABY BELLS DE-INTERNATIONALIZED? 
The previous section has charted the internationalization 
and de-internationalization of the Baby Bells. By 1995, however 
the “golden age” of Baby Bell internationalization had come to 
an end. From the mid-1990s onward, the Baby Bells exited 
international markets to such an extent that by 2006 they 
collectively retained just seven international investments. Thus, 
the answer to the question “Whatever happened to the Baby 
Bells?” is quite simply, that the Baby Bells returned to their 
home market of the United States. 
However, while this answer is an accurate description of 
what happened, it does not explain why the Baby Bells sold or 
divested almost all of their international investments. The de-
internationalization of the Baby Bells can be explained through 
three inter-related issues, namely: the financial returns from 
internationalization, the changing nature of regulation within 
the United States, and domestic merger and acquisition 
activity. 
 65. SBC COMM. INC., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 45 (1998); WHALLEY, supra 
note 27. 
 66. See AMERITECH, ANNUAL REPORT 1998 28F (1999). 
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Although some of the international investments made by 
the Baby Bells proved to be very successful financially, there is 
little evidence to suggest that this was widespread. While the 
Baby Bells draw attention in their annual reports to the 
financial success of some of their investments, particularly their 
cellular and public telephone operator investments, they are 
largely silent as to the financial success of their international 
investments in data, content, equipment, paging and services. 
Even though the annual reports of the Baby Bells do not 
provide sufficient detail to determine the financial success or 
otherwise of individual investments, they do provide some 
insight into the revenues and net income that the international 
investments of some of the Baby Bells generated.67 These 
examples clearly demonstrate that whereas internationalization 
may generate reasonable revenues and net income, Verizon and 
BellSouth rely predominantly on their domestic businesses for 
these. In other words, the financial contribution of their 
internationalization, even at its peak, was not that substantial. 
While the limited financial success of many of the 
international investments undoubtedly contributed to the Baby 
Bells’ de-internationalization, the remaining two issues are of 
greater importance. As noted above, the MFJ imposed four lines 
of business restrictions on the Baby Bells. The Baby Bells were 
allowed to invest in other non-regulated services in 1987 and 
information services in 1991, though they had to wait until the 
Telecommunications Act of 199668 before they were released, 
albeit subject to a fourteen-point competitive checklist in the 
case of inter-exchange telecommunication services, from the 
remaining two restrictions. The lifting of these restrictions 
created new investment opportunities for the Baby Bells in the 
United States, though it is arguably the case that the most 
significant and attractive of these opportunities was entry into 
the inter-exchange market. 
The Baby Bells were initially unsuccessful in their 
attempts at entering the inter-exchange market, not least 
because regulators at both the state and federal level felt that 
the local telephone markets served by the BOC were not 
competitive. Bell Atlantic and SBC were, however, successful in 
their attempts to expand their geographical footprint in the 
United States through merging with their fellow Baby Bells. 
 67. VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 2001 ANNUAL REPORT (2002); 
BELLSOUTH FOUND., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2004). 
 68. Telecommunications Act, supra note 26. 
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Notwithstanding the increasingly onerous conditions placed on 
the Baby Bell mergers by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), the mergers underlined the attractiveness 
of the inter-exchange market to the Baby Bells.69  The Baby 
Bell mergers expanded both Bell Atlantic’s and SBC’s presence 
in the local telephone market, markets that they could link 
together once they were able to enter the inter-exchange 
market. 
It is worth noting that Pacific Telesis and US West reacted 
differently to the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Pacific 
Telesis pre-empted the Act by divesting AirTouch 
Communications in 1994, thereby concentrating its attentions 
on its core California and Nevadan markets. At the same time, 
Pacific Telesis provided a wider range of services within these 
two states, thereby leading Maney to describe the strategy as 
“California First.”70 However, by the time the 
Telecommunications Act was passed this strategy had not been 
fully implemented, with the consequence that Pacific Telesis 
was weakened to such an extent that it was taken over by SBC 
for, in hindsight, a relatively modest sum. 
US West also exited its non-BOC territory businesses, 
albeit after the Telecommunications Act had become law. In 
some respects, the decision of US West to divest its domestic 
cable business was surprising; it had regularly drawn attention 
to the UK where cable-television and telephony could be 
combined, and had made several domestic purchases of cable-
television systems culminating with the $10.8 billion purchase 
of Continental Cablevision in early 1996. However, section 652 
of the Telecommunications Act prohibited a telephone company 
from owning more than 10% of a cable company providing 
service in the same area.71  Thus, while the FCC did approve 
the merger, it required the cable systems of Continental 
Cablevision within the region served by US West to be divested. 
As a consequence, US West was unable to combine cable-
 69. For a detailed discussion of FCC merger policy and the conditions 
placed on the Baby Bells, see Jim Chen, The Echoes of Forgotten Footfalls: 
Telecommunications Mergers at the Dawn of the Digital Millennium (Univ. 
Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-17, 2006). 
 70. MANEY, supra note 64, at 83f.  In 1995 Pacific Telesis paid $696 
million for PCS licenses covering California and Nevada and invested in 
wireless cable-TV, as well. PACIFIC TELESIS, FACT BOOK (1995). 
 71. Telecommunications Act, supra note 26; see also Chen, supra note 69, 
at 31. 
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television services with telephony and achieved only limited 
synergies. Both of these factors contributed to US West’s 
decision to divest MediaOne in 1998. 
As the attention of the Baby Bells turned towards their 
domestic markets, the Baby Bells began to de-internationalize. 
If the passing of the Telecommunications Act in 1996 and the 
granting of the first Baby Bell entry into the inter-exchange 
telecommunication services market in 1999 are superimposed 
on Figures 2 and 3 above, we can see that the latter coincides 
with the beginning of their de-internationalization. As the Baby 
Bells exited international markets, they re-deployed the freed 
capital within their domestic markets, partly to acquire other 
companies and partly to improve their infrastructure. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has charted the internationalization and de-
internationalization of the Baby Bells. All of the Baby Bells 
expanded internationally, making 198 international 
investments spread across eight different lines of business. 
However, both the number of investments made, and the lines 
of business favored, differ between the seven Baby Bells. The 
internationalization of the Baby Bells peaked in the mid-1990s, 
with de-internationalization coming to the fore after 2000. The 
Baby Bells have now sold all but seven of their international 
investments. 
The de-internationalization of the Baby Bells highlights the 
continued importance of the home market. It is arguably the 
case that while the restrictive regulatory environment imposed 
by the MFJ encouraged the Baby Bells to internationalize, 
changes in this environment also encouraged their de-
internationalization. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
allowed the Baby Bells to enter the inter-exchange market, 
while a liberal attitude to mergers/takeovers by the FCC 
allowed them to expand geographically. The Baby Bells did, 
albeit after a slight delay, enter the inter-exchange market and 
they did merge with one another. The de-internationalization of 
the Baby Bells contributed to the consolidation process by 
allowing capital invested overseas to be re-deployed within the 
United States. The end result was not only the effective 
abandonment of international telecommunications markets by 
the Baby Bells, but the creation of two vertically-integrated 
operators with national wireless footprints, namely, AT&T and 
Verizon Communications. 
